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ON FAIRNESS AND WELFARE ANALYSIS UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
 
1. Introduction 
There has been much interest in complementing the Pareto efficiency criterion
1 with an equity criterion to 
evaluate the efficiency of resource allocation along with welfare distribution issues in society. This can be 
done in several ways. First, maximizing a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function can be used to 
choose one among the many efficient allocations along the Pareto utility frontier (Bergson, 1938; 
Samuelson, 1955). When social welfare depends only on individual utilities, this has been termed 
“welfarism” by Sen (1982) and Roemer (1996).
2 Unfortunately, good prior information is often lacking 
about the exact nature of the social welfare function, thus reducing the general usefulness of this approach 
in addressing distribution issues. Second, coalition and bargaining games can be used to describe the joint 
action of individuals (e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). An example is the Nash bargaining game, 
which identifies a point on the Pareto utility frontier reflecting the relative bargaining positions of 
individuals (Nash, 1950). A limitation of this approach is that an ideal bargaining process does not always 
lead to a “just allocation” (Roemer, 1996).  
Third, an explicit equity criterion can be incorporated in economic analysis. Notable examples 
include Harsanyi (1953) and Rawls (1971). Harsanyi (1953) proposed an approach that uses the concept of 
the “original position” under a “veil of ignorance” where each individual does not known his/her relative 
position in society. Harsanyi’s approach is utilitarian: it relies on cardinal von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utilities and on an expected utility. It has the advantage of treating explicitly decision making under 
uncertainty. However, it has two significant limitations. First, growing empirical evidence against the 
validity of the expected utility model (e.g., Machina, 1987) raises questions about this approach. Second, 
cardinal utilities and interpersonal comparison of utility appear to be rather strong assumptions in  
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Harsanyi’s theory. This contrasts with Rawls’s approach. While Rawls (1971) also uses the “original 
position”, it relies on a fairness criterion that can be implemented without making interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. A fair allocation is said to exist in the absence of envy, where no agent wishes 
he/she were someone else. In general, the concept of fairness appears to be a reasonable equity criterion 
(e.g., Foley, 1967; Rawls, 1971; Kolm, 1972, 1996; Feldman and Kirman, 1974; Varian, 1974; Dworkin, 
1981; Baumol, 1986; Diamantaras, 1992; Arnsperger, 1994). Fairness is appealing in that it is intuitive, 
treats agents symmetrically, is ordinal in nature, and is free of interpersonal utility comparison. 
Applying a fairness criterion under a veil of ignorance has been seen as an attractive approach to 
evaluating equity (e.g., Harsanyi, 1953; Rawls, 1971; Kolm, 1972, 1996; Dworkin, 1981). Yet, if we rule 
out “welfarism” (e.g., Harsanyi’s utilitarian approach), introducing a veil of ignorance requires addressing 
explicitly information issues. While the analysis of Pareto efficiency under uncertainty is well developed 
(e.g., Graham, 1981, 1992), a “non-welfarist” analysis of Pareto efficiency involving a veil of ignorance is 
apparently lacking. This suggests a need to resolve this deficiency. 
The paper has two objectives. First, it presents a formal model of the role of information in Pareto 
efficiency. This provides a framework for analyzing the effects of a veil of ignorance on the efficiency of 
resource allocation. Second, the paper complements the Pareto efficiency analysis with a fairness criterion 
that is used to evaluate equity issues. Our main contribution is to fill the current gap between the economics 
of imperfect information, the veil of ignorance, and the incorporation of fairness in economic analysis. 
One problem with fairness is that it is not always consistent with Pareto efficiency (e.g., Pazner 
and Schmeidler, 1974; Goldman and Sussangkarn, 1978; Fleurbaey, 1994). This has stimulated interest in 
Pazner’s concept of “fair-equivalence”. Pazner (1977) defines an allocation to be fair-equivalent if there 
exists a fair allocation in some hypothetical economy and where each person enjoys the same welfare level 
in both allocations. An important result obtained by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) is that there always  
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exists an allocation that is both Pareto efficient and fair-equivalent. This motivates our focus on a fair-
equivalence criterion. 
This paper presents a welfare analysis of resource allocation that complements the Pareto 
efficiency criterion under uncertainty with a fair-equivalence criterion. Building on Harsanyi (1953), Rawls 
(1971), Kolm (1972, 1996), and Dworkin (1981), a hypothetical economy under a “veil of ignorance” is 
used to define equitable allocations. In this context, we develop concepts of social choice without relying on 
a utilitarian approach. Under ordinal individual preferences and without making interpersonal comparisons 
of utility, our approach builds on Pazner's (1977) concept of fairness equivalence, and on Graham's (1981, 
1992) characterization of Pareto optimality under uncertainty. It develops an ex ante evaluation of resource 
allocation that is both Pareto efficient and fair equivalent. We also stress the role of imperfect information 
in the analysis of distribution issues (e.g., as argued by Harsanyi, 1953, 1955; Dworkin, 1981).  
The paper builds on Graham’s (1981, 1992) work by incorporating distributional issues in welfare 
analysis under uncertainty. And it advances on the existing fairness literature by analyzing explicitly the 
role of uncertainty in the investigation of equity issues. We focus on a “thin” veil of ignorance where 
consumption decisions are made without information about individual characteristics. Our analysis stresses 
that using fairness as a motivation for redistribution policies requires good public information. By deriving 
a maximin criterion defined in terms of individual willingness-to-pay under ordinal preferences, we 
illustrate the usefulness of fairness in applied welfare economics. We also briefly discuss the relationships 
between our approach and others involving a veil of ignorance (e.g., Rawls, 1971; Kolm, 1972, 1996; 
Dworkin, 1981). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general model of the ex ante allocation of 
resources under uncertainty, given an ordinal representation of individual preferences. The model extends 
Graham’s analysis (1981, 1992) in several ways. First, it considers the design of public goods in the  
  4
presence of multiple private goods. Second, it examines the role of information in the efficiency of resource 
allocation. Third, it introduces a fairness-equivalence criterion as a means of choosing a point on the Pareto 
utility frontier. We characterize the set of Pareto-efficient allocations, including the choice of public goods 
and their method of financing. Making use of a veil of ignorance, the role of fairness in resource allocation 
is presented in section 3. This leads to a fair-equivalent and Pareto efficient allocation characterized by a 
maximin criterion defined in terms of individual willingness-to-pay. Section 4 investigates the role of 
information in public decision-making in terms of its implications for both efficiency and fairness. It is 
shown that, while better information typically generates improved efficiency, it can also contribute to unfair 
allocations. This stresses the importance of an explicit analysis of information in the investigation of 
distribution issues. Also, the effects of asymmetric information are discussed. 
 
2. Efficient allocation of public goods under uncertainty 
Consider resource allocation for a group of n individuals facing uncertainty, with n ≥  2. This involves 
choosing private goods as well as public goods. It will be convenient to interpret the public goods in terms 
of a “public project” chosen by a “social planner”. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of n individuals. This set 
includes the agents participating in the design and implementation of the project, the beneficiaries from the 
public goods it generates, as well as those paying for its cost (e.g., taxpayers). When n is large, this could 
involve government policy design (e.g., establishing a social safety net, managing pollution, building 
infrastructure, choosing public R&D, managing biodiversity, etc.). Alternatively, when n is small, this 
could mean choosing the terms and implementation of a contract among economic agents. The terms of the 
contract could include monitoring activities and/or the design of an incentive compatible mechanism.  
Uncertainty reflects imperfect information about factors affecting the n individuals (e.g., 
preferences, technology). The uncertainty is represented by S mutually exclusive states of nature, where ej  
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represents the j-th state, and E = {e1, e2, ..., eS} is the set of all possible states. It is typically not known 
ahead of time which state of nature will occur. Following Debreu (1959), we consider state-contingent 
commodities. Denote by yks the k-th public good under the s-th state of nature, k = 1, …, K, K being the 
number of public goods. Then, under S states of nature, the public goods are y = (y11, …, y1S; …; yK1, …, 
yKS) ∈  R
KS. And let xms be the quantity of the m-th private good under the s-th state of nature, m = 1, …, M, 
M being the number of private goods. Then, the private goods are denoted by x = (x11, …, x1S; …; xM1, …, 
xMS) ∈  R
MS. 
We consider alternative amounts of information for two reasons. First, the amount of information 
available is relevant in private as well public decision-making. For example, there may be significant 
differences between private and public information. The implications of this asymmetric information for 
public decision-making will be investigated below. Second, a “veil of ignorance” implies informational 
constraints on personal characteristics. The implications of these constraints will be analyzed below.  
Formally, information is represented by partitions of the set E of states.
3  Let ℘  denote the (finite) 
set of all possible partitions of E. Each partition P ∈  ℘  represents information generated by observing 
signals. Associating a signal with a particular element of P, the observation of this signal means knowing in 
which element of the partition P the true state resides.
4 Let P0 ∈  ℘  be the partition representing the 
information available for public decision-making. And let Pi ∈  ℘  be the partition representing the 
information available to the i-th individual, i ∈  N. We will consider the information structure P = (P0, P1, 
…., Pn) ∈  ℘
n+1.
5 First, we will treat this information structure as exogenous. We will relax this assumption 
in section 4 where we examine the choice of information. The quality of information available depends on 
the fineness of the associated partition. For two information partitions P and P' ∈  ℘ , let P F P' mean that 
the partition P is at least as fine as P'.
6  Intuitively, the finer the partition is, the less the uncertainty. This is  
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illustrated in figure 1, where observing the random variable α  generates the information partition Pα . If, in 
addition, the random variable β  is observed, this yields the information partition Pβ , where Pβ  F Pα .  
The n individuals must choose to allocate the private goods and the public goods, given uncertainty 
about the state of nature. Both private and public goods must be feasibly allocated given the available 
technology. Let xi
c = (x11i
c, …, x1Si
c; …; xM1i
c, …, xMSi
c) ∈  R
MS be the vector of state-dependent private 
goods consumed by the i-th individual, i ∈  N. Let x
a = (x11
a, …, x1S
a; …; xM1
a, …, xMS
a) ∈  R
MS be the 
vector of aggregate state-dependent netputs produced (where outputs are positive and inputs are negative). 
And let xi
p = (x11i
p, …, x1Si
p; …; xM1i
p …, xMsi
p) ∈  R
MS be the vector of state-dependent private goods 
contributed by the i-th individual in the production of the public goods y, i ∈  N. The technology used to 
produce the aggregate private netputs x
a is represented by the feasible set X ⊂  R
MS, with x
a ∈  X. The 
technology used to produce the public goods y from the private contributions (x1
p, …, xn
p) is denoted by Ω  
⊂  R
MS×  …× R
MS× R
KS, where (x1
p, …, xn
p; y) ∈  Ω . Throughout the paper, the set X and Ω  are assumed to 
be compact and with non-empty interior. 
Now, consider the preference structure underlying the resource allocation problem. Assume that 
the i-th individual's preferences over state-dependent private goods xi
c ∈  R
MS and state-dependent public 
goods y ∈  R
KS can be represented by the ex ante ordinal utility function ui(xi
c, y), i ∈  N. Throughout the 
paper, we assume that the utility function ui(xi
c, y) is continuous and quasi-concave in (xi
c, y). In general, 
ui(⋅ ) is ordinal, defined up to a monotonic increasing transformation. It is also ex ante as it involves state 
dependent commodities xi
c and y, which depend on states that may not be known ahead of time. The 
question of interest concerns the design of the public project under uncertainty. 
Here, we briefly review the Pareto efficiency of resource allocation of public goods, building upon 
and extending Graham's (1981, 1992) model. We also set the stage for incorporating an equity criterion in  
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welfare analysis (see section 3). Consider an allocation given by z = (x
a; x1
c, …, xn
c; x1
p, …, xn
p; y). It 
includes the choice of aggregate production of private goods x
a, of private consumption goods (x1
c, …, xn
c), 
of private goods used in the production of the public goods (x1
p, …, xn
p), and of the provision of public 
goods y. The public project consists in choosing the public goods y and its method of financing represented 
by the private contributions (x1
p, …, xn
p). We will assume that both y and (x1
p, …, xn
p) are chosen under 
the same public information P0.  
First, the allocation must be feasible.  
Definition 1: Under an information structure P = (P0, P1, …, Pn), a resource allocation z = (x
a; x1
c, …, xn
c; 
x1
p, …, xn
p; y) is said to be feasible if it satisfies: 
•  x
a ∈  X;
 7 xi
c ∈  R+
MS, i ∈  N; and (x1
p, …, xn
p; y) ∈  Ω . (1a) 
•  ∑i∈ N xi
c ≤  x
a - Σ i∈ N xi
p.    (1b) 
•  for every p in Pi ∈  ℘ , if es and es' are both in p, then     
xmsi
c = xms'i
c, m = 1, …, M, i ∈  N.  (1c) 
•  for every p in P0 ∈  ℘ , if if es and es' are both in p, then  
xmsi
p = xms'i
p, m = 1, …, M, i ∈  N,  (1d) 
and,  
yks = yks', k = 1, …, K.
8 (1e) 
 
Equation (1a) expresses technological feasibility represented by the production sets X for the 
private goods and Ω  for the public goods. Equation (1b) is the commodity balance for private goods. It 
states that aggregate consumption ∑i∈ N xi
c cannot exceed aggregate production x
a net of the inputs used in 
the production of the public goods Σ i∈ N xi
p. When the inequality in (1b) is binding, this makes it clear that  
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producing the public goods has an opportunity cost: the aggregate inputs Σ i∈ N xi
p tend to reduce 
consumption of the private goods. With xi
c, x
a and xi
p being state-dependent, the commodity balance must 
hold for every possible state s, = 1, …, S. Equation (1c) reflect the restrictions imposed by private 
information on the choice of the private consumption goods (x1
c, …, xn
c). Similarly, equations (1d) and (1e) 
imposes public information restrictions on the choice of the public goods y and the private contributions 
(x1
p, …, xn
p) used in the production of the public goods. They show how the choice of y and (x1
p, …, xn
p) 
depends on public information represented by the information partition P0: if it is not possible to distinguish 
between the states in p ∈  P0, then the public decisions (x1
p, …, xn
p, y) cannot depend on the e's in p.  
To evaluate of the allocation z = (x
a; x1
c, …, xn
c; x1
p, …, xn
p; y), we need to rely on some welfare 
measurement. For that purpose, consider a reference bundle of private goods g ∈  R+
MS, g ≠  0. We will take 
g to be state-independent, i.e., to involve the same private goods in every state.
9 This will provide the basis 
for evaluating the welfare of the n individuals. Following Luenberger (1992a), define the benefit function of 
the i-th individual 
bi(xi
c, y, Ui) = maxβ  {β : ui(xi
c - β  g, y) ≥  Ui, (xi
c - β  g) ≥  0},  (2) 
 
 
where Ui is an ex ante reference utility level, i ∈  N. Given (xi
c, y), expression (2) defines the benefit 
function bi(xi
c, y, Ui) as the largest quantity of the bundle g the i-th individual is willing to give up to reach 
the reference utility Ui. In the case where the unit value of the bundle g is 1, the benefit function can be 
interpreted intuitively as a measure of willingness to pay for the i-th individual facing (xi
c, y) to reach utility 
level Ui.  Luenberger (1992a, p. 464-466) has shown that, under the quasi-concavity of ui(xi
c, y), the 
benefit function bi(xi
c, y, Ui) is non-increasing in Ui and concave in (xi
c, y).  The benefit function bi(xi
c, y, 
Ui) defined in equation (2) provides a basis for analyzing the efficiency of group decision making. Consider 
the maximization of aggregate benefit under the information structure P = (P0, P1, …, Pn),  
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W(U, P) = Maxz {Σ i∈ N bi(xi
c, y, Ui): equations (1a), (1b), (1c), (1d) and (1e)},  (3a) 
 
where U = (U1, U2, ..., Un). Equation (3a) is intuitive: it chooses the allocation z so as to maximize 
aggregate benefit Σ i∈ N bi(xi
c, y, Ui) under feasibility constraints. And when the unit value of the bundle g is 
1, the aggregate benefit ∑i∈ N bi(xi
c, y, Ui) measures aggregate willingness-to-pay. Denote by z*(U, P) the 
resource allocation obtained as the solution to the optimization problem in (3a). This solution involves the 
choice of public goods y*, the choice of the individual contributions (x1
p*, …, xn
p*) used in the production 
of public goods, and production and consumption decisions for the private goods (x
a*, x1
c*, …, xn
c*). As 
shown by Graham (1992) and Luenberger (1992b), W(U, P) in (3) is a non-increasing function of U and 
provides a basis for evaluating the Pareto efficiency of resource allocation. Pareto optimality identifies 
allocations where no individual can be made better off without making someone else worse off.  
Proposition 1: Assume that preferences are non-satiated in g for at least one individual,
10 and that x
c > 0. 
Then, a necessary and sufficient condition for Pareto optimality is W(U, P) = 0.  
 
Proof:  From (2), feasibility of the utilities U = (U1, U2, ..., Un) implies that bi(xi
c, y, Ui) ≥  0, and thus that 
W(U, P) ≥  0. W(U, P) ≥  0 can be interpreted as an aggregate surplus. If W(U, P) > 0, this surplus 
can be redistributed to the individual that is non-satiated in g. This would make this individual 
better off without making others worse off, contradicting Pareto efficiency. Thus, Pareto efficiency 
implies W(U, P) = 0.  
Let z* = z*(U, P), where U satisfies W(U, P) = 0. Suppose there exists a feasible allocation z 
satisfying ui(xi
c, y) ≥  ui(xi
c*, y*) for all i ∈  N, and ui'(xi'
c, z) > ui'(xi'
c*, y*) for some i' ∈  N. This 
means that z* is not Pareto efficient. If xi
c > 0, then bi(xi
c, y , ui(xi
c*, y*)) ≥  0 for all i ∈  N, and  
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bi'(xi'
c, y , ui'(xi'
c*, y*)) > 0. It follows that z satisfies Σ i∈ N bi(xi
c, y, ui(xi
c*, y*)) > 0, which 
contradicts W(U, P) = 0. Thus, W(U, P) = 0 implies Pareto optimality.  
Proposition 1 states that, under some regularity conditions, for any U satisfying W(U, P) = 0, z*(U, 
P) provides a Pareto optimal allocation of resources among the n individuals. The aggregate net benefit 
W(U, P) can be interpreted as a distributable surplus. First, feasibility requires that W(U, P) ≥  0. This is a 
group budget constraint, where aggregate net benefit is non-negative. Violating this aggregate budget 
constraint would mean that the utility levels U cannot be attained. Second, an allocation for which W(U, P) 
> 0 cannot be Pareto optimal since it identifies the existence of a positive surplus which can always be 
redistributed to make at least one individual better off without making anyone worse off. As a result, W(U) 
= 0 is a necessary and sufficient condition for Pareto optimality. Since the Pareto optimality criterion is 
widely accepted by economists, this provides a basis for conducting welfare analysis.  
It is worth emphasizing that the private contributions (x1
p*, …, xn
p*) in (3a) are actually made. 
They support the production and financing of the public project, and are treated as an integral part of the 
efficiency criterion. This contrasts with the hypothetical compensation tests commonly used in applied 
welfare analysis (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939; Scitovsky, 1941; Samuelson, 1950).  
Solving the equation W(U, P) = 0 for U = (U1, U2, ..., Un) generates an infinite number of solutions 
for U. These solutions identify the Pareto efficiency frontier expressing utility trade-off under efficient 
allocation as welfare distribution varies across individuals (Samuelson, 1955; Graham, 1992). This raises 
the question of how movements along the utility frontier will affect the decisions z*(U, P). In the case of 
quasi-linear preferences (where the public goods and the private goods involved in the project exhibit zero 
income effects), then y*(U, P) is independent of U. This is the domain of application of the Coase (1960) 
theorem, where the efficiency of choosing the public goods y*(U, P) is independent of distribution issues. It 
means that the move along the Pareto utility frontier can be generated through a simple redistribution of  
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income across individuals without influencing the efficiency of public good provision. Alternatively, in the 
presence of income effects for the public goods and/or for the private goods involved in the project, the 
efficient project design will depend on U. Then y*(U, P) and (x1
p*(U, P), …, xn
p*(U, P)) will vary with U 
as one moves along the Pareto utility frontier. In this context, the Pareto optimality criterion (as stated in 
Proposition 1) falls short of providing precise guidance on which public choice should be made. This is the 
situation where it is no longer possible to separate efficiency and distributional issues. This suggests a need 
to address these distribution issues (see below). 
The Pareto optimality results presented above are quite general. For example, they hold without 
imposing convexity restrictions on the sets X and Ω . However, additional results can be obtained under 
more restrictive conditions. Such results are explored below. They will help establish linkages with 
previous literature on welfare analysis under uncertainty.  
Assumption A1: The set sets X and Ω  are convex. 
Assumption A2: There exists a feasible point z where the constraints (1b) are non-binding. 
 
Under these assumptions, we obtain an alternative characterization of the aggregate net benefit 
W(U, P) given in (3a). 
Proposition 2: Assume that preferences are non-satiated in g for at least one individual, that x
c > 0, and that 
assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Then,  
W(U, P) = Minλ  Maxy {B(y, λ , U) - C(y, λ ): λ  ∈  R+
MS, equations (1c), (1d) and (1e)},  (3b) 
where  
B(y, λ , U) = ∑i∈ N Maxxc≥ 0 [bi(xi
c, y, Ui) - λ  ⋅  xi
c] + Maxxa [λ  ⋅  x
a: x
a ∈  X] measures aggregate 
gross benefit,  
and   
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C(y, λ ) = Maxxp [λ  ⋅  Σ i∈ N xi
p: (x1
p, …, xn
p; y) ∈  Ω ] is the aggregate cost of producing the 
public goods y.  
 
Proof: Under assumptions A1 and A2, the maximization problem (3a) can be alternatively expressed in 
terms of the Lagrangean L(z, λ , U) = Σ i∈ N bi(xi
c, y, Ui) + λ  ⋅  [x
a - Σ i∈ N xi
p - ∑i∈ N xi
c], where λ  ∈  
R+
MS is a vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with constraint (1b). More specifically, (3a) 
implies that the Lagrangean has a saddle-point z*(U, P), λ *(U, P) such that z*(U, P) is a solution 
to (3) (see Takayama, p. 75). It follows that (3a) can be alternatively written as 
W(U, P) = Minλ≥ 0 Maxz {Σ i∈ N bi(xi
c, y, Ui) + λ  ⋅  [x
a - Σ i∈ N xi
p - ∑i∈ N xi
c] 
: equations (1a), (1c), (1d) and (1e)}, 
= Minλ≥ 0 Maxy {Σ i∈ N Maxxc≥ 0 [bi(xi
c, y, Ui) - λ  ⋅  xi
c] + Maxxa [λ  ⋅  x
a: x
a ∈  X]  
- Maxxp [λ  ⋅  Σ i∈ N xi
p: (x1
p, …, xn
p; y) ∈  Ω ]: equations (1c), (1d) and (1e)}, 
which yields (3b). 
The Lagrange multipliers λ * ∈  R+
MS solving (3b) have the standard interpretation of measuring the 
shadow price of the state-dependent commodities. Under assumptions A1 and A2, applying (3b) to 
Proposition 1 yields the following result: Pareto optimality is obtained by maximizing the aggregate gross 
benefit B(y, λ , U) net of aggregate cost C(y, λ ) with respect to public goods y, by minimizing the result 
with respect to the prices λ , and then by redistributing entirely the distributable surplus W(U, P) to the n 
individuals. Choosing public goods y by maximizing aggregate gross benefit net of aggregate cost is 
intuitive. Here, aggregate gross benefit B(y, λ , U) = ∑i∈ N Maxxc≥ 0 [bi(xi
c, y, Ui) - λ  ⋅  xi
c] + Maxxa [λ  ⋅  x
a: x
a 
∈  X] is the sum of two terms: the sum of individual consumer benefits net of consumer expenditures, and 
aggregate profit Maxxa [λ  ⋅  x
a: x
a ∈  X]. The latter states that the private netput decisions x
a are made in  
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way consistent with profit maximization under prices λ . And (3b) shows that the relevant prices λ * ≥  0 are 
the ones that minimizes the maximized net benefit: Maxy {B(y, λ , U) - C(y, λ ): equations (1c), (1d) and 
(1e)}. This establishes useful linkages between state contingent markets and Pareto optimality.  
While (3b) provides an alternative characterization of the distributable surplus W(U, P) given in 
(3a), note the role played by assumptions A1 and A2. Indeed, assumptions A1 (the convexity of sets X and 
Ω ) and A2 are needed to guarantee the existence of prices λ  in (3b). However, such assumptions are not 
required in (3a). This indicates that the formulation of distributable surplus given in (3a) is more general 
than (3b) since the former applies under less restrictive conditions. Alternatively, (3b) has the advantage of 
providing useful insights in the role of prices in Pareto optimality. Indeed, measuring distributable surplus 
W(U, P) using (3b), proposition 1 gives an alternative way of characterizing Pareto optimality in a market 
economy. 
The following corollary establishes the linkages between our analysis and Graham's (1981, 1992) 
approach to welfare analysis under uncertainty. 
Corollary 1: Consider the case where there is a single private good (M = 1), and where g = (1, …, 1) 
denotes one sure unit of the private good (i.e., one unit obtained under every state s = 1, …, S). Let 
x
a = ∑i∈ N xi
a, where xi
a = (xi1
a, …, xiS
a) is the (exogenous) state-dependent endowment for the i-th 
individual, i ∈  N. Assume that preferences are non-satiated in g for at least one individual, that x
c 
> 0, and that assumptions A1 and A2 hold. If λ  ⋅  g = 1, then 
 W(U, P) = Minλ  Maxy {Σ i∈ N Maxxc≥ 0 [λ  ⋅  (xi
a - xi
c): ui(xi
c, y) ≥  Ui] 
- Maxxp [λ  ⋅  Σ i∈ N xi
p: (x1
p, …, xn
p; y) ∈  Ω ]: λ  ∈  R+
MS , equations (1c), (1d) and (1e)}.  (3c) 
  
  14
Proof:  Under a single private good, the aggregate gross benefit B(y, λ , U) in (3b) becomes B(y, λ , U) = 
∑i∈ N Maxxc≥ 0 [bi(xi
c, y, Ui) - λ  ⋅  (xi
c - xi
a)]. Luenberger (1992a, p. 472-479) has shown that, under 
the continuity and quasi-concavity of ui(xi
c, y) and given λ  ⋅  g = 1, Maxxc≥ 0 [bi(xi
c, y, Ui) - λ  ⋅  (xi
c - 
xi
a)] = -Minxc≥ 0 [λ  ⋅  (xi
c - xi
a): ui(xi
c, y) ≥  Ui], which can be alternatively expressed as Maxxc≥ 0 [λ  ⋅  
(xi
a - xi
c): ui(xi
c, y) ≥  Ui]. Thus, (3b) implies (3c). 
Corollary 1 provides an alternative expression for the distributable surplus when assumptions A1 
and A2 hold, there is a single private good, and λ  ⋅  g = 1. Again, under the conditions stated in Corollary 1, 
measuring distributable surplus W(U, P) using (3c), proposition 1 gives an alternative way of 
characterizing Pareto optimality in a market economy. Note that, except for the informational constraints 
(1c), (1d) and (1e), equation (3c) is the net benefit criterion proposed by Graham's (1992) in his analysis of 
welfare analysis under uncertainty. This shows that our analysis extends Graham's (1981, 1992) approach 
in three ways. First, it allows for multiple private goods. Second, it considers the case of imperfect 
information. This will prove important in our analysis of fairness presented below. Third, Graham's (1981, 
1992) approach focuses on the case where (λ  ⋅  g) = 1. Given g = (1, …, 1), then (λ  ⋅  g) = 1 in (3c) is a 
normalization rule for prices implying that one sure unit value of the private good is chosen as the 
numeraire. From (3c), note that both the gross aggregate gross benefit B(y, λ , U) = Σ i∈ N Maxxc≥ 0 [λ  ⋅  (xi
a - 
xi
c): ui(xi
c, y) ≥  Ui] and the aggregate cost C(y, λ ) = Maxxp [λ  ⋅  Σ i∈ N xi
p: (x1
p, …, xn
p; y) ∈  Ω ] involve a 
weighted sum of quantities across states, where the weights are the state-dependent prices λ  = (λ 1, …, λ S), 
λ s being the price of the private good under the s-th state of nature, s = 1, ..., S.  
  As noted above, in the presence of income effects where y*(U, P) depends on U, the choice of the 
public goods varies as one moves along the Pareto utility frontier. In addition, changing the distribution of 
private contribution (x1
p*, …, xn
p*) is expected to affect the distribution of welfare. These are situations  
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where efficiency and distribution issues must be jointly addressed. This stresses the need for an equity 
criterion that would select an efficient allocation with desirable distribution attributes. In the following 
section we develop a fairness criterion for use in public decision-making.  
 
3. A fairness criterion 
The literature on fairness in economics and welfare analysis is vast (e.g., Foley, 1967; Rawls, 1971; Kolm, 
1972, 1996; Varian, 1974; Feldman and Kirman, 1974; Pazner, 1977; Pazner and Schmeidler, 1974, 1978; 
Crawford, 1977; Dworkin, 1981; Thomson, 1983; Thomson and Varian, 1985; Baumol, 1986; 
Diamantaras, 1992; Arnsperger, 1994; Fleurbaey, 1994, 1995; Sprumont and Zhou, 1999). Fairness has 
been defined as the absence of envy (Foley 1967) where no individual would prefer what another has to 
what he/she has. The concept of fairness is appealing for several reasons: it provides an intuitive basis for 
analyzing distribution issues; it exhibits symmetry across individuals; it is consistent with on ordinal 
representation of individual preferences; and it is free of interpersonal comparison of utility. Indeed, 
fairness only requires each individual to evaluate others' bundle using their own (ordinal) preferences.  
We propose a definition of fairness that is always consistent with the Pareto optimality criterion. 
Our approach to fairness involves a joint evaluation of the choice of the private goods x, and the design of 
the public project, including the private resources used (x1
p*, …, xn
p*) and the public goods produced y. Of 
special interest is the distribution of the private contributions (x1
p*, …, xn
p*). Since they are expected to 
affect the distribution of welfare across individuals, they are always relevant in the fairness evaluation of 
the project.  
In the evaluation of public decisions, we wish to discover conditions under which the project design 
(x1
p*, …, xn
p*, y*) generates an equitable distribution of its benefits in the group. For that purpose, we rely 
on the concept of fair-equivalence proposed by Pazner (1977).   
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Definition 2: A feasible allocation is fair equivalent if there exists a fair allocation in some hypothetical 
economy where each person enjoys the same welfare level in both allocations.  
 
Our hypothetical economy is obtained under a “veil of ignorance” where individuals do not have 
information about their individual characteristics. Intuitively, the veil of ignorance restricts the available 
information. Here, we define our “veil of ignorance” so that no information is available about individual 
characteristics in the choice of the consumption goods (x1
c, …, xn
c). The absence of information allowing a 
distinction between individuals in the allocation of private consumption goods implies the information 
constraint x1
c = x2
c = … = xn
c, meaning that all individuals are restricted to obtain the same consumption 
goods.
11 Note that this allows other decisions to rely on information on individual characteristics. Thus, we 
rely on a  “thin” veil of ignorance: the private contributions x
p and the production decisions x
a are not 
subject to it. This allows individuals to develop insurance schemes (through the x
p’s), to acquire and 
control assets, and to benefit from labor specialization. We first characterize the resource allocation under 
the veil of ignorance. In this context, consider the following hypothetical allocation: 
W
v(U, P) = Maxz {Σ i∈ N bi(xi
c, y, Ui): equ. (1a), (1b), (1c), (1d) and (1e); x1
c = … = xn
c}. (4) 
 
Equation (4) chooses an allocation that maximizes aggregate benefit under a “thin veil of 
ignorance” where the decisions about xi
a are evaluated under restricted information. Denote the solution to 
(4) by z
v(U, P). Given the restrictions x1
c = … = xn
c, the allocation z
v(U, P) is necessarily fair, either ex 
ante or ex post. Indeed, since everyone receives the same bundle (x
av, y
v), there is no basis for anyone to 
envy any other. Note that this relates to Rawls’s approach if the consumption goods x
a are among Rawls’ 
“primary goods.” It resembles Sen’s approach if x
a are among Sen’s “functionings” (Sen, 1982). Also, our 
veil of ignorance is similar to Kolm’s “thin” or “minimal” veil of ignorance (Kolm, 1972, 1996). Finally,  
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our analysis relates to Dworkin’s approach where a hypothetical insurance market under a veil of ignorance 
is used as a means of implementing an equitable allocation (see our discussion below). 
W
v(U, P) in (4) is the aggregate benefit or distributable surplus obtained under the veil of 
ignorance. Since (4b) is a restricted version of (3a), it follows that W(U, P) ≥  W
v(U, P). For a given U, this 
means that aggregate benefit in (3a) is at least as large as in (4). Thus, imposing the veil of ignorance on 
the choice of consumption goods tends to yield a decrease in distributable surplus and an efficiency loss 
associated with an inward shift in the Pareto utility frontier. Of special interest here is the distribution of 
these benefits across individuals. For a given U = (U1, …, Un), the benefit obtained by the i-th individual 
under the veil of ignorance is bi
v(U, P) =  bi(xi
cv(U, P), y
v(U, P), Ui).  
Now consider some arbitrary feasible allocation z = (x
a; x1
c, …, xn
c; x1
p, …, xn
p; y). At this point, 
this allocation may not be Pareto optimal. Define  
bi
v(x
c, y, P) = bi(xi
cv(u1(x1
c, y), …,  un(xn
c, y), P), y
v(u1(x1
c, y), …, un(xn
c, y), P), ui(xi
c, y)),  (5) 
 
i ∈  N, where x
c = (x1
c, …, xn
c). The benefit bi
v(x
c, y, P) in (5) measures the quantity of the bundle g the i-th 
individual under the veil of ignorance (as represented by the solution z
v(U, P) to (4)) is willing to give up to 
be indifferent with the allocation z. In the special case where the unit value of the bundle g is 1, then bi
v(x
c, 
y, P) can be conveniently interpreted as a monetary compensation. In general, bi
v(x
c, y, P) < 0 (> 0) means 
that the i-th individual is better off (worse off) under z than under the veil of ignorance. The veil of 
ignorance being hypothetical, the compensation bi
v(x
c, y, P) is also hypothetical, i ∈  N.
12  
Our characterization of fairness-equivalence is based on the compensations bi
v(x
c, y, P), i ∈  N, 
evaluating the distribution of benefits associated with exchanging the hypothetical fair allocation (4) with 
the current position (where individual characteristics may become known).   
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Proposition 3:  Consider a feasible allocation z = (x
a; x1
c, …, xn
c; x1
p, …, xn
p; y) under information 
structure P. Assume that individual preferences are non-satiated in g, and that [xi
cv(U, P) - bi
v(x
c, y, 
P) g] > 0, i ∈  N. Then, z is fair-equivalent if 
b1
v(x
c, y, P) = … = bn
v(x
c, y, P)), (6) 
where bi
v(x
c, y, P) is defined in (5). 
 
Proof:  From (5), bi
v(x
c, y, P) = bi(xi
cv(U, P), y
v(U, P), ui(xi
c, y)), where U = (u1(x1
c, y), …,  un(xn
c, y)). If 
[xi
cv(U, P) - bi
v(x
c, y, P) g] > 0, i ∈  N, then the definition of the benefit function in (2) implies that 
ui(xi
cv(U, P) - bi
v(x
c, y, P) g, y
v(U, P)) = Ui, i ∈  N. In other words, (xi
cv(U, P) - bi
v(x
c, y, P) g, y
v(U, 
P)) generates the same individual welfare level as (xi
c, y), i ∈  N. But the hypothetical allocation 
(x
av; x1
cv - b1
v(x
c, y, P) g, …, xn
cv - bn
v(x
c, y, P) g, x1
pv, …, xn
pv; y
v) satisfying (6) is always fair. 
Indeed, under (6), every individual faces the same bundle (xi
cv - bi
v(x
c, y, P) g, y) and thus cannot 
envy any other. This means that the allocation z generates the same welfare levels as the 
hypothetical fair allocation (x
av; x1
cv - b1
v(x
c, y, P), …, xn
cv - bn
v(x
c, y, P), x1
pv, …, xn
pv; y
v), i.e. that 
z is fair-equivalent.  
Proposition 3 states that, under some regularity conditions, the allocation z = (x
a; x1
c, …, xn
c; x1
p, 
…, xn
p; y) is fair-equivalent if the benefits bi
v(x
c, y, P) are equally distributed among the n beneficiaries. It 
is general in the sense that it is applicable to any feasible allocation (including allocations that are not 
Pareto efficient). It also indicates that, if preferences are non-satiated in g, any situation where bi
v(x
c, y, P) 
≠  bi'
v(x
c, y, P)) for some i ≠  i' ∈  N, is not fair-equivalent: it generates benefits that are not evenly distributed 
among the n individuals. This suggests the following index of fairness for the i-th individual: 
Ii(z, P) = bi
v(x
c, y, P) - [∑i'∈ N bi'
v(x
c, y, P))]/n, i ∈  N.  (7) 
  
  19
The index Ii(z, P) is a simple measure of the excess benefit obtained by the i-th individual as 
compared with the average benefit across all individuals within the group.
13 Given that preferences are non-
satiated in g, a fair-equivalent allocation corresponds to Ii(z, P) = 0 for all i ∈  N. This can provide useful 
information on the nature of the departure from fairness-equivalence. For example, finding Ii(z, P) < 0 
means that the allocation z is unfair and that the unfairness is in favor of the i-th individual. Alternatively, 
finding Ii(z, P) > 0 means that the allocation z is unfair and that the unfairness is to the detriment of the i-th 
individual. The index Ii(z, P) has some desirable characteristics. It can measure both the direction and the 
strength of unfairness or inequity. And it provides a continuous measure of envy or unfairness under 
ordinal preferences.
14 Thus, it seems to be an attractive measure of equity (or inequity) in the analysis of 
distribution issues. 
Some general implications of our fairness criterion are worth noting. First, an allocation involving 
egalitarian private contributions x1
p = … = xn
p is not necessarily fair equivalent. The reason is that the 
allocation of private consumption goods (x1
c, …, xn
c) can contribute to lack of fairness. In this case, public 
decision-making may actually choose unequal private contributions (x1
p, …, xn
p) to correct and eliminate 
this inequitable allocation. Second, if all individuals have the same preferences and the same resources, 
then an egalitarian distribution of (x1
p, …, xn
p) would always be fair-equivalent. Indeed, in this case, each 
individual would obtain the same benefit from the public goods y and would choose the same private goods 
x
c, implying that fairness-equivalence holds. Third, whether or not all individuals have the same preferences, 
any heterogeneity of resources across individuals can contribute to envy and unfairness. In this case, one 
expects that a fair equivalent allocation may involve some redistribution of income and/or resources. Fourth, 
consider the situation where individuals are heterogeneous in their preferences and/or resources, but there is 
no public information available to discriminate among them. In such a case, there would be no basis for 
implementing non-egalitarian private contributions (x1
p, …, xn
p). Under such an information structure, a  
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fair-equivalent allocation would necessarily be egalitarian in (x1
p, …, xn
p). This suggests that, as argued by 
Hayek (1960), the absence of good public information about individuals can compromise justification for 
income or wealth redistribution policy. Alternatively stated, effective redistribution policies require good 
public information about individual characteristics. These issues are further discussed in section 4.  
Note that Proposition 3 applies also to Pareto optimal allocations. Naturally, our claim that fair 
equivalence and Pareto efficiency are useful for public decision-making would be weakened if allocations 
satisfying both criteria did not always exist. Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) established the following result.  
Proposition 3: (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978). There always exists an allocation that that is both Pareto 
efficient and fair equivalent.  
 
The proof can be obtained by construction. Start with some feasible egalitarian allocation (e.g., 
under the veil of ignorance). It is necessarily fair but possibly inefficient. Consider a move to the Pareto 
utility frontier. Under continuity, we can always choose the particular move that generates equal net 
benefits (e.g., as measured by bi
v(x
c, y, P) in (5)) for all n individuals. The resulting allocation is 
necessarily fair equivalent. This implies that a fair-equivalent and efficient allocation always exists. Under 
information structure P, denote this Pareto optimal and fair-equivalent allocation by z
+(P). 
Since efficiency and fairness-equivalence can always be made consistent with each other, this 
suggests the possibility of combining them in economic analysis. More specifically, we look for a way to 
formulate an optimization problem that would incorporate fairness-equivalence with Pareto efficiency. For 
a given information structure P, the constructive proof of Proposition 3 suggests considering the following 
maximin problem: 
 w
+(P) =  Maxz {Mini∈ N {-bi
v(x
c, y, P): equations (1a), (1b), (1c), (1d), and (1e)}}.  (8) 
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Recall that bi
v(x
c, y, P) measures the quantity of the bundle g the i-th individual under the veil of 
ignorance is willing to give up to become indifferent with the allocation z. Thus, bi
v(x
c, y, P) < 0 when an 
allocation z is a welfare improvement over the veil of ignorance. In this case, [-bi
v(x
c, y, P)] > 0 is the 
compensation (quantity of g) the i-th individual must receive to reach the same welfare level as under the 
allocation z. Thus, starting from the veil of ignorance, a Pareto welfare improvement (which makes no 
individual worse off) implies [-bi
v(x
c, y, P)] ≥  0 for all i ∈  N. Some of these welfare improvements can lead 
to an efficient point on the Pareto utility frontier. Assume that preferences are non-satiated in g. Then, by 
definition of a maximum, the solution to (8) is necessarily on the utility frontier. And it must be fair-
equivalent and satisfy b1
v(x
c, y, P) = … =  bn
v(x
c, y, P), since any other efficient allocation could be subject 
to a move benefiting the individual with lowest [-bi
v(x
c, y, P)] that would increase the value of the objective 
function. It follows that the solution of the optimization problem (8) always generates an efficient and fair-
equivalent allocation, z
+(P). Thus, expression (8) provides a basis for conducting welfare analysis of public 
decisions under the requirements of obtaining an efficient and fair-equivalent allocation. It can be 
interpreted as a formalization of the maximin criterion as a measure of social welfare. It requires only 
ordinal individual preferences. And it is free of interpersonal comparisons of utility.  
These results can be compared and contrasted with models that have been proposed in the search 
for normative criteria evaluating the distribution of resources. This includes the Nash bargaining model 
(e.g., Nash, 1950; Harsanyi, 1977) and models of collective choice (e.g., Harsanyi, 1953, 1955). Both the 
Nash bargaining model and Harsanyi’s models were developed in the context of a cardinal von Neuman 
Morgenstern utility function and expected utility preferences. In contrast, our approach only requires 
personal ordinal ranking of alternative allocations. Thus, it allows for non-expected utility representation of 
risk preferences. For example, it applies if ex ante preferences are non-linear in the probabilities. And it  
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even applies in situations where probabilities may not exist (e.g., the case of rare events where individuals 
may have little basis for evaluating relative likelihood).  
The optimization problem (8) is intuitive and provides a way of identifying efficient and fair-
equivalent allocations. One can imagine that problem (8) represents the outcome of negotiations between 
members of the group. In general, if the individuals treated the most unfairly (i.e., with the lowest [-bi
v(x
c, y, 
P]) are involved in the negotiations, they would likely make proposals that move toward an efficient and 
fair-equivalent outcome. Upon convergence, this would eventually lead to the allocation represented by (8). 
However, this may not be the case if the individuals treated unfairly are not involved in making proposals. 
In such a situation, the negotiation process within the group may break down. This may invite the 
involvement of an outside arbitrator or of the Courts, brought in when the parties involved fail to reach an 
agreement acceptable within the group. To the extent that arbitrators or the Courts are concerned with 
fairness, our proposed scheme can provide useful insights into their role and influence on the efficiency and 
distribution of resource allocation in decision-making. 
 
4. The role of information 
So far, we have treated the information structure P = (P0, P1, …, Pn) as given, where P0 is the information 
partition of E = {e1, …, eS} relevant for public decision making, and Pi is the information partition of E 
relevant for the consumption decisions made by the i-th individual, i ∈  N. In this section, we explore the 
welfare implications of the information P for both efficiency and fairness. This is motivated by the fact that 
collective choices are often made in situations where there are public disputes about the relevant 
information available.  
Proposition 4: Consider two information structures P
a = (P0
a, P1
a, …, Pn
a) ∈  ℘
n+1  and P
b = (P0
b, P1
b, …, 
Pn
b) ∈  ℘
n+1. Assume that Pi
b is at least as fine as Pi
a for all i = 0, 1, .., n: Pi
b F Pi
a, ∀ i. Then,   
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W(U, P
b) ≥  W(U, P
a), (9) 
where W(U, P) is defined in (3a).  
 
Proof: From (1c), (1d), and (1e), finer information partitions impose fewer constraints on state-dependent 
choices. As a result, switching from P
a and P
b in the optimization problem (3a) tends to expand the 
feasible region for z. Then, the inequality in (9) follows from the fact that the maximized value of 
an objective function cannot decrease under a larger feasible region. 
Proposition 4 compares two information structures P
a and P
b, where P
b is at least as informative as 
P
a.  It states that a finer information structure cannot decrease the distributable surplus W(U, P).
15 This 
reflects that the value of costless information is always non-negative as more information allows for more 
refined private as well public decision rules. The refinements tend to increase the distributable surplus W(U, 
P). In turn, the increased distributable surplus can be redistributed to the n individuals. If it were 
redistributed to individuals with preferences that are non-satiated in g, this would increase their welfare 
without making any one else worse off. This generates the following well-known corollary. 
Corollary 2: Providing costless information tends to improve efficiency. 
 
Corollary 2 indicates that more costless information tends to shift up the Pareto utility frontier. 
This result is consistent with the extensive literature on moral hazard and adverse selection where lack of 
information has adverse effects on the efficiency of allocation (e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Hart and 
Olmstrom, 1987).  
What are the implications of information for equity? Clearly, this depends on how the benefits of 
information are distributed among the n individuals. The fairness of this distribution can be captured by the 
index Ii(z, P) in (7), i ∈  N. Consider the case of an efficient and fair equivalent allocation z
+(P
a) under  
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information structure P
a, obtained as a solution to (8) What happens if the information structure improves 
from P
a to P
b? While Proposition 4 indicates the presence of efficiency gains, the distribution of these gains 
can affect fairness in any possible direction. On the one hand, it is possible that this would lead to an 
efficient allocation z*(U
b, P
b) where U
b satisfies W(U, P
b) = 0, but where Ii(z*(U
b, P
b)) ≠  0 for some i ∈  N. 
In this case, the improvement in information would generate an efficient allocation that is not fair 
equivalent. Indeed, learning can affect the distribution of individual benefits in inequitable ways. Thus, 
obtaining more costless information is not always “better” once fairness is taken into consideration. In 
general, the knowledge that becomes available moving from the hypothetical fair allocation under the veil 
of ignorance to the actual allocation influences the distribution of benefits bi
v(x
c, y, P) in (5)). This means 
that the agents who stand to benefit the most from new information may also have incentives to hide their 
personal characteristics. For these individuals, efficiency and fairness involve real trade-off: the availability 
of new information will tend to improve economic efficiency at the same time as it may identify them as 
unfair beneficiaries of an efficient allocation.  
On the other hand, when information improves from P
a to P
b, our analysis indicates the existence of 
an efficient and fair-equivalent allocation under information P
b. This is given by z
+(Pb) obtained as a 
solution to (8). To the extent that the distribution of the efficiency gains from better information leads to 
inequity, this means that the design of the public project would correct it to reestablish fair-equivalence 
through an appropriate choice of the public goods y
+(P
b) and the private contributions (x1
p+(P
b), …, 
xn
p+(P
b)). If equity issues are relevant, this stresses the presence of important interactions between 
information, the choice of public goods, and the method of financing the public project.  
So far, we have treated information as exogenous and costless. If information were costless, then 
Proposition 4 would imply that all decisions based on imperfect information would tend to be inefficient. In 
other words, all efficient private and public decisions should be based on perfect information. This is not  
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realistic. The reason is that information is costly. To reflect it, assume that improving information requires 
the use of resources. This can be introduced in our model by assuming that the feasible sets X and Ω  
depend on the information structure P: X(P) and Ω (P). For example, if P
b is more informative than P
a, then 
X(P
a) ⊃  X(P
b) and Ω (P
a) ⊃  Ω  (P
b), implying that obtaining additional information (either private or public) 
uses resources. In this case, improving information would have an explicit opportunity cost. Then, the 
choice of information involves trading off the benefit of information (as identified in Proposition 4) and its 
cost (Radner, 1968).
16 This can be analyzed along the lines presented in section 2. After introducing X(P) 
and Ω (P) in equation (1a), the distributable surplus W(U, P) would still be given by (3a). Consider 
choosing the information structure P*(U) that solves the maximization problem 
W(U, P*(U)) = MaxP {W(U, P): P ∈  ℘
n+1}. 
For a given U = (U1, …, Un), W(U, P*(U)) is the largest possible distributable surplus after 
information has been chosen. Under the regularity conditions stated in Proposition 1, if this distributable 
surplus is entirely redistributed to the n individuals (with U chosen such that W(U, P*(U))  = 0), the 
resulting allocation is Pareto optimal. This identifies a Pareto optimal allocation z*(U*, P*(U*)) along with 
the Pareto optimal information structure P*(U*), where U* ∈  {U: W(U, P*(U))  = 0). In the context where 
information is costly, P*(U*) is the optimal information that trades off its benefits versus its cost such that 
no individual can be made better off without making some one else worse off. The set of utilities U 
satisfying W(U, P*(U))  = 0) identifies the Pareto utility frontier. As discussed above, to the extent that 
there are many points on this frontier, this provides incomplete guidance for project design as well as for 
the choice of information.  
To examine the implications of information for fairness, given X(P) and Ω (P), consider the 
efficient and fair equivalent allocation z
+(P) obtained as a solution to (8). w
+(P) in equation (8) measures 
the hypothetical quantity of the bundle g each individual must receive under the veil of ignorance to be  
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indifferent with the allocation z
+(P). Clearly, information structures P that increase w
+(P) are improving 
efficiency. Consider choosing P
+ so as to maximize w
+(P):  
w
+(P
+) = MaxP {w
+(P): P ∈  ℘
n+1},   (10) 
 
where w
+(P) is defined in (8). Using the arguments presented in section 3, it follows that z
+(P
+) and P
+ 
identify the efficient and fair equivalent allocation. This provides useful insights to evaluate the role of 
information in project evaluation and design.  
Proposition 5: Given X(P) and Ω (P),   
w
+(P
+) ≥  0, 
where w
+(P
+) is defined in (10). 
 
Proof:  Comparing (3a) and (4), we have noted that W(U, P) ≥  W
v(U, P). This means that, for any given 
information structure P, the restrictions applied on (x1
c, …, xn
c) under the veil of ignorance tend to 
shift the Pareto utility frontier inward. This implies that w
+(P) ≥  0 in (8) for all P ∈  ℘
n+1, and thus 
that w
+(P
+) ≥  0 in (10).   
Proposition 5 suggests the existence of trade-off between the (hypothetical) veil of ignorance (given 
in equation (4)) and the actual allocation. Indeed, while the former is always fair, it is in general inefficient. 
As one moves from the hypothetical fair allocation to the actual allocation, individual characteristics 
become known and can be used in making consumption decisions. Proposition 5 reflects that such a move 
can generate efficiency gains. And as shown in equation (6), fairness equivalence imposes restrictions on 
how these (hypothetical) gains get distributed among the n individuals.  
As discussed in section 3, there is one situation where distribution issues remain simple. This is the 
case where all individuals are identical and face the same preferences, same resources and same  
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information technology. Then, treating all individuals the same would always be fair. Indeed, all individuals 
would make the same consumption decisions. Thus, w
+(P
+) = 0 in (10) since there would be no difference 
between the hypothetical fair allocation (4) and the actual situation given by (8). However, this is a rather 
restrictive case. 
What happens when individuals are heterogeneous?  From Proposition 5, either w
+(P
+) = 0 or 
w
+(P
+) > 0. First, consider the case where w
+(P
+) = 0. This would apply in the (unlikely) situation where no 
information is available to distinguish between individuals in choosing the consumption decisions (x1
c, …, 
xn
c). Then, fairness-equivalence would always be satisfied and could not be used to justify a welfare 
redistribution policy. Second, consider the more realistic case where w
+(P
+) > 0, i.e. where information 
about individual characteristics influences consumption decisions. This information generates efficiency 
gains that can be redistributed among the n individuals. Does that mean that the public project should play 
a role in redistributing welfare? Not necessarily. Even if w
+(P
+) > 0, it is still possible that the public 
information P0
+ fails to distinguish among the n individuals. In this case, there would be no public 
information to choose contributions (x1
p, …, xn
p) that differ across individuals. Thus, the public project 
would necessarily involve egalitarian contributions x1
p = … = xn
p. And there would be no basis for a public 
welfare redistribution policy (e.g., as suggested by Nozick, 1974). Such situations can arise under 
asymmetric information, generating adverse selection problems (when some individual information is not 
available publicly) as well as moral hazard problems (where some individual actions are not observed 
publicly). Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that adverse selection problems can contribute to the 
failure of insurance markets. In such situations, individual information that is easily falsified is not used in 
resource allocation decisions. This is consistent with Dworkin (1981): falsifiable individual information 
(e.g., “expensive tastes”) cannot be insured and thus is not relevant in equity evaluation. Thus, asymmetric 
information and adverse selection can undermine the motivations for public redistribution policies.  
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Similarly, moral hazard problems have adverse effects on efficiency and can contribute to the failure of 
contracts (e.g., Hart and Holmstrom, 1987). Under such circumstances, individual information associated 
with “hidden individual actions” is not used in decision-making. This suggests that situations that are easily 
influenced by hidden individual actions may not be relevant for equity considerations. In other words, under 
asymmetric information, equity concerns should focus on conditions that are not subject to significant 
moral hazard (e.g., natural disasters). This is consistent with Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989, 1990) and 
Cohen (1989), who focus on the role of responsibility. They argue that equity should relate only to 
conditions resulting from circumstances over which individuals cannot be held responsible.  
Next, consider situations where public information available about individuals is actually used in 
the public project. This indicates that the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (due to 
asymmetric information) are not too severe so that individual information can support insurance schemes 
and contracts. This means good public information (e.g., due to monitoring) as well as a limited extent of 
asymmetry between private and public information. For example, the public information about individual 
situations should not be easily falsified (thus ruling outcome “expensive taste”) and should not be greatly 
influenced by hidden actions (suggesting a focus on situations that tend to be beyond individual control). In 
such situations, public information about individuals would be used in resource allocation decisions 
according to (8) and (10), yielding an efficient and fair-equivalent allocation with w
+(P
+) > 0. Such 
allocation may involve significant transfers across individuals. These transfers would be designed as an 
efficient way of generating a fair-equivalent allocation. They can involve cash transfers (e.g., tax policy, 
unemployment insurance) as well in-kind transfers (e.g., food stamp program, land reform). In the absence 
of asymmetric information, cash transfers are the typical instruments used in implementing a redistribution 
policy. However, under asymmetric information, in-kind transfers may be better. Blackorby and Donaldson  
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(1988) have shown that in-kind transfers may then be preferred because they help self-select the targeted 
individuals.  
These arguments stress the importance of information in designing and implementing redistribution 
policies. There are many illustrative examples. Paarlberg (1980) gives a compelling example concerning 
the historical development of the U.S. food stamp program: 
“In May 1968, the Columbia Broadcasting System presented an hour-long documentary bearing 
the title “Hunger, U.S.A.”. Hunger was portrayed vividly before a nationwide audience. The 
documentary was a sensation and undoubtedly laid the basis for the subsequent rapid expansion of 
the food stamp program. I know of no other television documentary that so vividly illustrates the 
power of the media in influencing public policy”. (p. 101) 
 
This problem then is: how to choose the public information that can support an efficient and fair-
equivalent allocation? This can be addressed by designing incentive-compatible contracts that provide 
incentives to reveal private information, and/or by obtaining additional public information through 
monitoring activities. In the former case, incentive compatibility constraints would typically give an 
“information rent” to informed individuals and would shift the Pareto utility frontier down (e.g., Laffont, 
1989). In the second case, any monitoring cost would also shift the Pareto utility frontier down. Which 
approach is more effective depends on the relative cost and aggregate benefits each can generate.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has presented an approach to welfare analysis under uncertainty that complements the Pareto 
efficiency criterion with a fairness criterion. It focuses on the design and implementation of private and 
public goods, their method of financing, as well as the choice of the information available for public 
decision-making. It makes use of a fairness equivalence criterion, and of a “veil of ignorance” used to  
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define a reference fair hypothetical economy. Allocations that are both Pareto efficient and fair equivalent 
always exist. The analysis relies on actual payments (corresponding to the financing of the public goods) as 
well as hypothetical compensations used to evaluate fairness. A fair-equivalent and Pareto efficient 
allocation leads to a maximin criterion defined in terms of individual ex-ante willingness-to-pay. This 
maximin criterion provides a basis for the implementation of our approach in benefit-cost analysis. Our 
analysis also provides useful insights in the role of information in the efficiency and fairness of public 
decision-making. It shows that, while better information typically generates improved efficiency, it can also 
contribute to unfair allocations. It also stresses the effects of asymmetric information in the evaluation of 
equity. By incorporating both efficiency and equity issues in welfare analysis, we hope that our proposed 
approach can help improve the evaluation, design and implementation of public projects and their method 
of financing.
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 Figure 1 – Example of Uncertainty.  
 
 
ex ante  ex post   states 
Pa   P αααα    P ββββ        Pp 
   
     γ 1   e 1 = (α 1, β 1, γ 1) 
   β 1    
     γ 2   e 2 = (α 1, β 1, γ 2) 
  α 1      
     γ 1   e 3 = (α 1, β 2, γ 1) 
   β 2 
     γ 2   e 4 = (α 1, β 2, γ 2) 
 
     γ 1   e 5 = (α 2, β 1, γ 1) 
   β 1    
     γ 2   e 6 = (α 2, β 1, γ 2) 
  α 2      
     γ 1   e 7 = (α 2, β 2, γ 1) 
   β 2 
     γ 2   e 8 = (α 2, β 2, γ 2) 
 
 
α , = (α 1, α 2), β  = (β 1, β 2), γ  = (γ 1, γ 2) are random variables.   
 
The information partitions are:  
Pa = {{e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6, e7, e8}}   (ex ante) 
Pα  = {{e1, e2, e3, e4}, {e5, e6, e7, e8}}   (observing α ) 
Pβ  = {{e1, e2}, {e3, e4}, {e5, e6}, {e7, e8}} (observing  α  and β ) 
Pp = {{e1}, {e2}, {e3}, {e4}, {e5}, {e6}, {e7}, {e8}}   (ex post). 
 
These information partitions satisfy: 
Pp F Pβ  F Pα  F Pa.  
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Footnotes 
                                                     
1. An allocation is said to be Pareto efficient if no individual can be made better off without making some 
else worse off. 
 
2. This includes as a special case “utilitarianism”, where social welfare is expressed as the sum of 
individual utilities. 
 
3. A partition P = {p1, p2, …} is a collection of non-empty subsets of E whose intersection is empty (pi ∩  pj 
= ∅  for all i ≠  j), and whose union is the set E itself (p1 ∪  p2 ∪  … = E). 
 
4. At one extreme, perfect information corresponds to the partition P = {{e1}, {e2}, ..., {em}}, where each 
element of P identifies a particular state. At the other extreme, the absence of any information corresponds 
to a partition P consisting of a single element (the set E). 
 
5. For simplicity, while allowing for information asymmetry, we assume that all private and public 
decisions are made at the same time: all public decisions are made based on the same public information P0; 
and all private consumption decisions of the i-th individual are made under the same private information Pi, 
i ∈  N. Introducing learning in the model could be easily done. This would involve considering that the each 
public decision is based on different information (and thus a different partition of E) depending on the 
amount of public learning taking place. And each private decision could be based on different information 
(and thus a different partition of E) depending on the amount of private learning. Under such circumstances, 
one issue may be the consistency (or inconsistency) of decisions over time. Under appropriate weak 
separability assumptions of the utility functions, decisions made under ex ante versus ex post preferences 
would be consistent (e.g., Luenberger, 1995, p. 399). Note that such assumptions are satisfied under 
expected-value utility functions (since they are strongly separable). But they may not hold under non-
expected utility formulations. Addressing this issue, Machina (1989) rejects the assumption that individuals 
would choose along a decision tree while neglecting earlier information in the tree. Under non-expected 
utility preferences, he argues that individuals always make decisions that are consistent with their ex ante 
plans. Then, dynamic inconsistencies do not arise as individuals always stick to the original plan.  
  
6. By definition, P F P’ if, for every p ∈  P and p' ∈  P', either p ⊂  p' or p ∩  p' = ∅ . 
 
7. For simplicity, we assume that the informational constraints related to the choice of aggregate netputs x
a 
are included in the set X. 
 
8. In the case where the states of nature include information about individual characteristics, then (1e) 
needs to be complemented by the restrictions that the yks’s are the same for all n individuals. This would 
guarantee that the public goods are truly “public.”  
  
9. For example, we could choose g = (1, …, 1; …; 0, …,0) which involves one unit of the first private good 
in every state. 
 
10 Non-satiation in g for the i-th individual means that ui(xi
c + α  g, y) is strictly increasing in α  > 0 for all 
feasible allocations.   
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11. It could be argued that the veil of ignorance would also affect the preference function. Indeed, if 
individuals do not have information on their individual preferences, then their ex ante utility function would 
take the form u(xi
c, y), assuming that that the states include information about individual characteristics. 
Then, u(xi
c, y) would be a fundamental preference function under the veil of ignorance. This fundamental 
preference function is the same for all individuals since it is evaluated before information becomes available 
about individual preferences. While we do not make use of this fundamental preference function below, our 
analysis would apply as well in this context. 
 
12. Thus, as in the compensation principle proposed by Kaldor (1939), Hicks (1939) and Scitovsky (1941) 
--KHS--, hypothetical compensations do play a role in our analysis. However, in the KHS approach, it is 
the payments that are hypothetical. In sharp contrast, our approach treats the private contributions x
p as 
actual. Here the hypothetical compensations bi
v(x
c, y, P), i ∈  N, are used simply to assess the fairness of 
the allocation. 
 
13. Note that many alternative indexes of inequality have been proposed in the literature (e.g., see Atkinson 
1975). 
14. Note that Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson (1990) have proposed alternative 
continuous measures of envy.  
15. It should be kept in mind that the result stated in Proposition 4 does not hold in general if the two 
information structures P
a and P
b cannot be ranked according to F. In such cases, a measure of the 
difference in aggregate net benefit generated by P
a versus P
b is: W(U, P
b) - W(U, P
a). Finding W(U, P
b) - 
W(U, P
a) > 0 would identify a Pareto improving move from P
a to P
b, implying that the information 
structure P
a is not Pareto optimal. Alternatively, finding W(U, P
b) - W(U, P
a) < 0 means that the 
information structure P
b  is not Pareto optimal. 
 
16. Note that, although it is not the focus of this paper, the arguments presented below concerning the 
choice of information could be easily extended to include the information used in choosing the production 
netputs x
a. 